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Abstract
Risks of natural and anthropogenic disasters can appear at any moment without 
warning. All levels of government agencies from federal to township, and the sys-
tems of the specialized agencies, like weather-specialists, flood control, electricity 
suppliers, and educational organizations are standardized and the communication 
has been improving. The systems of the governments and agencies, meteorologists, 
flood control, electricity suppliers, and educational organizations are standardized 
and the communication has been improving. In this chapter, government manuals, 
procedures for agencies and professional responders, and public awareness, percep-
tions, and capabilities, are reviewed in three international cities: Seoul, Tokyo, and 
Toronto. Each city is unique with experiences of different disasters. Communication 
of supports and vital information of risks without understanding the language and 
culture of the people may lead the public to large-scale panic. Individuals can access 
government websites and interpret the information, like WebGIS maps, and risks 
by themselves. In terms of risk communication, all urbanized cities require their 
own specialized risk management with reasonably effective technologies, which 
enhance community resilience. Even better is to have a measure of development for 
the care of the public after the disaster to help the people get back on their feet, such 
as various public insurances.
Keywords: disaster risk management, risk communication, WebGIS, SNS, Seoul, 
Tokyo, Toronto
1. Introduction
1.1 Risk on disasters
The United Nations [1] summarized the cities’ risk of exposure to natural disas-
ters. Of the 1692 cities with at least 300,000 inhabitants in 2014, 944 (56%) were at 
high risk of exposure to at least one of six types of natural disaster (cyclones, floods, 
droughts, earthquakes, landslides, and volcano eruptions), based on the evidence 
on the occurrence of natural disasters over the late twentieth century. Floods were 
the most common type of natural disaster affecting cities, followed by droughts and 
cyclones. Twenty-seven highly developed cities, such as Seoul and Tokyo, have to 
deal with higher risk of exposures to three or more types of disasters and are more 
vulnerable to disaster-related economic losses and mortality.
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1.2 Risk communication in emergency situation
According to Ortwin Renn [2, 3], the field of risk communication was initially 
developed as a means of investigating how best expert assessments could be com-
municated to the public, so that the tension between public perceptions and expert 
judgment could be bridged. Risk communication links scientists, decision makers, 
professional performers, communication specialist, and the public. Also, risk commu-
nication is to assist stakeholders and the public at large in understanding the rationale 
of a risk-based decision, and to arrive at a balanced judgment that reflects the factual 
evidence about the matter at hand in relation to their own interests and values [4].
These days, advanced technologies are applied for better effective communica-
tion on answering the “want to know” questions that Michael S. Baram [5] sum-
marized the concept of “genetic right-to-know laws” on hazard communication in 
manufacturing work environment. Risk communication between governmental 
agents and individual personnel would be focused in different ways. In most of the 
cases under the emergency circumstances, any government agents have to focus on 
their urgent roles rather than to contact with civilian individuals. Conversely, any 
individual personnel expect that they can receive the information that they want 
to know or need to know. In terms of the interactive risk communication between 
groups, such as different government agencies, agents, and individuals are often 
appearing to lack in interactive communication because of the differences of their 
own interests. Each level of government agencies including state government, 
municipality, township, and even specialized agencies such as weather-related 
groups, flood control, electricity suppliers, and educational organizations can send 
out the general information with professionally analyzed results.
Today, all types of information are shared via the Internet, with which anyone 
can freely access details about others’ daily lives. The information can contain 
disasters’ natural characteristics and mechanisms with forecasts, damage level and 
its costs, information acquisition methods, evacuation routes, location of shelters 
and emergency supplies, school re-openings, hospital capabilities and capacities, 
information on relocation of patients, road conditions, information-related insur-
ance, and even family member’s safety confirmation. Among communication 
devices, including landline phones and computers, mobile phones are the most 
effective and primary devices for global communication [6]. In the case of the 2011 
Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, some victims, especially 
isolated victims, had no connection to the outside and experienced great fear and 
anxiety on obtaining information they want; the transmission towers of mobile 
phone were broken and they lost electricity and thus lost the ability to even recharge 
their mobile phones [7]. For risk communication under severe circumstances—for 
example, flooding, earthquake, wildfires, terror, explosions, and others—informa-
tion is the most important matter for everyone.
Information is available from multiple sources, from online sources and web-
based media, personal conversation, mass media, and official and unofficial 
reports. However, individuals uniquely internalize this overwhelming information 
and judgmentally amplify their risks in various ways and degrees [8]. Rumors, or 
gossip, pass around easily (and thus, fairly quick) which may lead people to wrong 
directions or decisions, especially under emergency circumstances. Hence, the accu-
rate information and the correct and effective instructions to maintain the safety of 
people and the society are one of the important roles for the government agencies.
Although every government tries to develop a disaster risk preparedness manual 
and educate public to enhance the risk perception, disaster risk governance is fairly 
a new concept [8]. Risk governance requires more one-directional communica-
tion rather than interactive communication. Arnold Howitt emphasizes the crisis 
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management communication, which interprets risk more narrowly with four 
fundamental rules that apply to the government agencies (as cited in [9]);
• Say What You Know
• Say What You Are Doing
• Say What Others Should Do
• Offer Perspective
The information must contain two different phases at least; phase of prepared-
ness prior to an emergency and phase of the said emergency. The preparedness 
phase will suggest how to get ready for risks, while the latter phase should give an 
idea to the public where the safe place is located or how to protect themselves when 
the disaster occurs.
1.3 Utilize technology for risk communication
During the time of crisis or emergency, the critical issue is whether the people 
understand what to do. To empower people with knowledge and information before 
crisis (the “nonemergency time” or “disaster preparedness phase”), government agen-
cies use websites to provide access to this information. Mapping technologies, such as 
geographic Information System (GIS) associated with Web application environment, 
are an effective method of disaster-risk communication to amplify the information to 
broader audience and population. When incidents or disasters occur, governmental 
agencies implement intensive tasks such as scientific analysis, forecasts, finding safe 
places and access to get there, dispatch rescue teams and give instructions for safety 
activities, and so on. Under these circumstances, government staffs frequently appear 
on the media to try to communicate with the public. In the circumstance under emer-
gency, GIS technology has precisely functioned and clearly proved its effectiveness. 
9.11 World Trade Center Attack was one of the significant incidents, and GIS technol-
ogy was well-exercised. Since this event, GIS and Web technology was combined and 
developed for the next advanced world technological risk communication.
Social network services (known as SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube 
are the mostly used web tool for interactive communication in emergency situations. 
These service users are not only victims, but also supporters and governmental 
agencies that send the detail of information on how/when/where to get help [7]. The 
real-time situational information from the victims—for example, victims’ condi-
tions, actual detailed help list, health situation of the victims, security problems, 
and other sorts of information—is actively exchanged through these SNS services.
2. Risk management in three cities
The insurance company Lloyds pointed out at the report of Lloyd’s City Risk 
Index 2015–2025 that mega-cities (such as Seoul, Tokyo, New York, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, and London) are exposed to risks of combination of high economic value 
losses and high exposure to both natural catastrophes and manmade risks. Cities 
with high asset values are the most financially exposed in absolute terms [10].
The comparison of three large cities, Seoul, Tokyo, and Toronto, is very unique 
work because of their different profiles of risks they face in their respective coun-
tries. Their common characteristics are that all are very urbanized capital towns 
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with the highest population in each county as shown in Table 1, the center of the 
financial activities, and very globalized. Tokyo, for example, is one of the largest 
cities in the world with the population and economy, and the capital city of Japan, 
which is a country well recognized as the disaster kingdom of the world. Toronto, 
Canada is a metropolitan city that is a popular choice for newcomers including 
immigrants and refugees, short-term residents, or visitors that are exposed to 
different categories of potential disasters and risks than Japan. On the other hand, 
Seoul, Korea is a dense mega-city that is close to Japan, China and also to North 
Korea. Risks for Seoul are different from the risks of Tokyo or Toronto.
According to the report of the London-based insurance company, Lloyds [10] 
classifies 18 types of threat risks with 5 categories: finance and trade (market crash, 
sovereign default, and oil price shock), geopolitics and society (terrorism), natural 
catastrophe and climate (earthquake, wind storm, tsunami, flood, volcanic eruption, 
drought, freeze, and heat wave), technology and space (nuclear accident, power 
outage, cyber-attack, and solar storm), and health and humanity (human pandemic 
and plant epidemic). They assess the threat of all 18 types and how likely that city 
can experience a number of representative scenarios of different magnitudes from 
that threat (3 representative scenarios). Lloyds developed metrics for economic 
consequences and applied the equation for the ‘expected loss (loss × the probability)’ 
which is called gross domestic product (GDP)@risk for each city. This model is 
implemented for identifying which cities and threats are the most important.
2.1 Seoul, Korea
2.1.1 Background
Seoul is the capital city of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the place for 
a habitat of 10,178,395 people [11]. As of the end of 2010, the area of Seoul is 
605.25 km2, which is about 0.6% based on the total land area (100,033 km2) at the 
same time [12]. The population density of Seoul has continuously increased with 
population growth. After the Korean War and temporary population drop, the city 
of Seoul accepted many people into its area, which followed population boom in the 
city and forced the architecture of Seoul upward to address the housing problems, 
building tall apartments in the 1990s to house the increasing population growth. As 
of the end of 2010, the population density of Seoul is 17.473 people/km2 [12, 13].
City Country 
or area
Statistical 
concepts
City population 
(thousands)
Average 
annual rate 
of change 
(percentage)
City population as 
a proportion of the 
country or area’s total or 
urban population in 2016 
(percentage)
2000 2016 2030 2000–
2016
2016–
2030
Total 
population
Urban 
population
Seoul Republic 
of Korea
City proper 9878 9779 9960 −0.1 0.1 19.6 23.7
Tokyo Japan Metropolitan 
area
34,450 38,140 37,190 0.6 −0.2 30.1 32.1
Toronto Canada Metropolitan 
area
4607 6083 6957 1.7 1.0 16.8 20.5
Table 1. 
Three cities’ population (modified, [1]).
5Functional and Technical Methods of Information and Risk Communication
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84488
Korea is the only divided country in the world that has been in a state of continu-
ing confrontation with North Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Seoul 
is only 23 km (in the shortest distance) away from North Korea. The confronta-
tion with North Korea for 65 years has kept Seoul citizens in a high level of crisis 
cognition. Nonetheless, with a remarkable economic growth, foreign residents are 
increasing since 2014. According to the Brookings Institute, Seoul-Incheon is placed 
fourth with total GDP with 846 billion US dollars of the world’s largest city econo-
mies in 2014, which was almost the same as Los Angeles (860) (Tokyo was the first 
with GDP 1600) (as cited in [14]. In 2015, nominal GDP of Seoul-Incheon (popula-
tion 25,095 thousands) was 25,095,903 million US dollars and nominal GDP/capita 
in 2015 was 466 36,002 million US dollars [15]. Seoul is one of the richest cities in 
the world.
2.1.2 Risks in Seoul
It seems that all these experiences influenced the surveys that are conducted 
by the Statistics Korea [16] every 2 years for the 10 social indicators system. This 
data will be available on May 16 for approximately 39,000 household members 
aged 13 years or older residing in the 25,843 sample households nationwide for the 
five indicators in family, education, health, safety, and environment. Regarding 
awareness of social safety, 20.5% of the respondents felt that the society was “safe” 
overall. The most significant anxieties about the social safety were crime (50.8%), 
traffic accidents (47.6%), new diseases (42.8%), and information security (42.5%), 
in relative order. For the question of emergency and emergency situations, most 
(96.8%) “knew the telephone number (119, etc.)” in the case of an emergency. 
Seoul residents feel that social indicators are more severe real-life threats than 
natural disasters. The result of the survey is summarized in Table 2.
Lloyds [10] defines that Seoul is facing the risk of windstorm (44.68 billion) 
economic loss as shown in Figure 1 the most, and this is 3.5 times more than the 
oil price stock threat of 12.72, at the second place. Therefore, Seoul is very vulner-
able to typhoons. In addition, due to the proximity of oil price shock and market 
crash, and because Korea has experienced it already in the past, Korea has to react 
sensitively to the international economic market (1997–1998 Korea financial crisis, 
which was triggered by 1997 Asian financial crisis). However, earthquake and 
tsunami were assessed as zero risk in Seoul, while they were the most threatening 
disaster risk for Tokyo. The total GDP@risk is estimated as103.50 billion US dollars 
with all 18 threats.
2.1.3 Improvement of crisis management and risk communication
For a long time, the constructed structure of the governance during an emer-
gency is hierarchical. A national crisis incident that occurs within a ward is reported 
by the staffs of the ward government to the chief of the ward, which is then 
reported to the municipal council; the municipal council summarizes the issue(s) 
and, then, reports to the provincial board. The members of the provincial board 
collect and then report to the federal government, where the chief of that level 
(usually the president) is the decision-maker for an incident. The decision is then 
trickled down from the province, to the city, and down to the ward, for the emer-
gency response to take place. This pyramidal communication structure is inherently 
slow and involves too many individuals in which a report must be filtered through. 
This introduces complexities such as missing information, distortion of crisis, 
misunderstanding of issues, and/or severity of the emergency.
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Total Safe Very Relatively Normal Not 
safe
Relatively Not at 
all
Overall 
social 
safety
2016 100.0 13.2 1.1 12.1 41.2 45.5 36.1 9.4
2018 100.0 20.5 1.3 19.2 48.2 31.3 27.6 3.7
National security 
(war potential, 
North Korean 
nuclear issue)
100.0 31.1 3.2 27.9 35.6 33.3 27.3 6.0
Natural disasters 
(typhoons, 
floods, and 
earthquakes
100.0 22.8 1.6 21.1 39.6 37.6 32.2 5.4
Buildings 
and facilities 
(collapse and 
explosion)
100.0 23.9 2.1 21.8 43.3 32.8 28.0 4.7
Traffic accident 100.0 13.1 0.9 12.2 39.2 47.6 38.4 9.3
Fire (including 
forest fire)
100.0 20.9 1.8 19.2 48.0 31.1 26.6 4.5
Food (defective 
food and food 
poisoning)
100.0 25.4 2.3 23.2 43.4 31.1 25.5 5.7
Food security 
(grain flooding 
and food 
shortages)
100.0 37.8 5.9 31.9 43.7 18.5 15.4 3.1
Information 
security 
(computer virus 
and hacking)
100.0 17.5 1.6 15.9 40.0 42.5 33.4 9.0
New diseases 
(new virus)
100.0 16.7 1.4 15.3 40.5 42.8 34.7 8.1
Crime 100.0 17.2 1.8 15.4 32.0 50.8 38.0 12.8
Bold values indicate the most recently surveyed and the highest values in the categories.
Table 2. 
Recognition of social safety (unit: %).
Figure 1. 
GDP@risk metrics for Seoul (modified, [17]).
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There was a significant incident, which was an important turning point and a 
trigger, which forced Korea to review and overhaul its crisis management system, as 
well as replace the government administration with the decision from presidential 
authority; the significant incident is known as the “Sinking of MV Sewol” in 2014. 
The South Korean ferry sank while carrying 476 people, mostly secondary school 
students from Danwon High School (Ansan City). In total, 304 passengers and crew 
members died in the disaster [18, 19]. Of the approximately 172 survivors, more 
than half were rescued by fishing boats and other commercial vessels that arrived 
at the scene approximately 40 minutes after the South Korean coast guard. As the 
Korean government’s attitude toward disaster responses and all the procedures of 
rescue work were inadequate, regulatory authorities who directed and supervised 
them were socially criticized, and their attitude of avoiding their responsibility was 
enough to buy public sympathy [20, 21]. Perhaps, this incident is one of the most 
suitable examples of Heinrich’s law1.
With these experiences, with sufficient stimulation in the city of Seoul, the city 
of Seoul authorities made an overall review of the disaster response and initiated 
the reorganization. The city of Seoul developed the disaster management com-
munication guideline in 2014 [22]. Newly developed “the City of Seoul Crisis 
Management Communication Guidelines” emphasize four priority values of risk 
communication capabilities: empathy, transparency, professionalism, and responsi-
bility. Figure 2 is the diagram that describes the concept of priority value of the risk 
communication.
In order to prevent the confusion of reporting system, the Seoul Metropolitan 
Facilities Management Corporation improved its reporting system in case of 
emergency situation as shown in Figure 3. The direction of the arrows indicates 
the direction of reporting of an incident; one-way arrows represent only reporting 
and lack of interactive communication (one states “confirm occasionally”, which 
indicates that no actions are taken) and a head group that takes control or respon-
sibility in implementing a plan during an emergency [23]. From this diagram, for 
example, the hydro-related disaster, the decision makers are far and dislocated from 
the incident scene, which means that the duration to report to the decision makers 
takes longer time and the order (decision to act) demands for more time to be com-
municated back to the scene for an actual work. Thus, there is no clear indication 
1 Heinrich’s Law: Heinrich’s work is claimed as the basis for the theory of behavior-based safety by some 
experts of this field, which holds that as many as 95% of all workplace accidents are caused by unsafe acts. 
(Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_William_Heinrich).
Figure 2. 
Four priority values of risk communication capabilities and its expected value criteria (modified, [22]).
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of how much the decision makers understand the real situation and take actions 
or responsibility. It is easy to assume that such structure would result in delayed 
communication and introduce unnecessary complications (especially in between 
the communicators), and overly long decision-making time. Meanwhile, it does not 
address who takes charge or takes responsibility to control or direct an emergency; 
thus, the field works are forced to deal with victims, the crisis, and their own safety 
on the line without a clear authority, permission, or instruction.
Realizing the shortcomings and inefficiencies of the hierarchical or pyramidal 
communication system, the national emergency management agency of Korea 
(normally known as the Department of Fire and Emergency) developed their own 
drill manual [24] with incorporating with other agencies. Based on convergence of 
administration, the mutually developed cooperation and integration of the agencies 
divide the complicated workflow.
Despite the efforts made by the Seoul Metropolitan Government to revise its 
crisis management guidelines after the 2014 MV Sewol sinking incident, the govern-
ment’s ability to manage crises has been criticized, again, widely and intensely on the 
way they responded to the 2015 MERS outbreak incident [9]. A joint panel of experts 
from the World Health Organization and South Korea announced that the South 
Korean government’s failure to share information quickly with the public and estab-
lish an efficient disease-control system contributed to worsening the outbreak of 
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), which has killed 14 people in the coun-
try [25] and this event was another significant incident to receive social criticism of 
the government and its stakeholders and their awareness of crisis management.
2.1.4 The IT country: utilizes advanced IT technology
As an IT powered country, the capital city of Seoul is working on risk com-
munication by operating a well-organized portal-website as shown in Figure 4 
(top image). This website provides breaking news, action procedures, evacuation 
facilities, related public agencies, weather information, and the information for the 
press. Also, the website has a linkage option that jump to the new window where 
anyone can join the discussion with certain subject, leave comments, and apply sug-
gestions. GIS interactive map is generated by clicking of the icon on the right panel 
with the information icon.
Although technology is shifting to Cloud, WebGIS technology is still used 
widely, as those who use the technology are divided in the proficiency of available 
technologies, but the trend of GIS is heading toward cloud-based technology. GIS 
Figure 3. 
Diagram of situation report flow between departments in government offices [23].
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maps allow users to identify certain facility locations with accurate coordination, 
query function to call up the associated database information, so end-user can 
get information by several times of clicking. The disaster maps of Seoul give an 
option to generate satellite image as background map (Figure 4: bottom left) or 
topography map (Figure 4: bottom right); then users can recognize where they are 
located, where they want to go, what to look for, or identify facilities and its basic 
information, (such as the name of facility, address, functions, and its capability). 
For example, the map of evacuation shelters provides information about shelters: 
earthquake indoor/outdoor shelters, extreme heat weather shelters, water facilities, 
storage area for snow removal equipment, and general disaster maps. This inte-
grated GIS map has functions associated with the database, which are very limited 
and still need improvement for the real-time support system. Despite Seoul’s copi-
ous efforts and technologies, this website has only provided information in Korean, 
and no other languages are available at this time.
Among the weather-related disasters, it is clear that the typhoon and flooding 
are big threats when considering the Han River (a large river that passes through the 
middle of Seoul from east to west). The history of Seoul’s modern sewerage dates 
back to the opening of the late nineteenth century. At that time, the importance of 
the sewage treatment for the prevention of infectious diseases and the improvement 
of public sanitation was recognized, and drainage function was moved from the 
river to the modern sewer model [27].
As of the end of 2015, the city of Seoul is discharging sewage and rainwater 
to four water reclamation centers through the sewage lines (about 10,000 km), 
manholes (260,000), and rainwater catchers (470,000). The amount of sewage that 
Figure 4. 
The city of Seoul safety web portal, which is called “Seoul Safety Nuri” that gives information about current 
disaster status and suggests a direction where shelters are located and its capability [26].
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has been treated and flowing into the rivers reaches 4.98 million cubic meters/day. 
Currently, the city of Seoul has faced a new era of change [27]. As global climate 
change intensified, Korea is entering change from a sub-tropical climate of four 
seasons in temperature to a more two seasons of extreme temperature differences. 
Seoul faces a large risk of natural disasters such as urban flooding and drought. As 
the phenomenon of heat island occurs more frequently, more powerfully, and for 
longer periods, it is necessary to cope with thorough water management.
2.2 Tokyo, Japan
2.2.1 Background
As of 2014, the greater Tokyo area was ranked as the most populous metropoli-
tan area in the world (Table 1; [1]). The 23 Special Wards of Tokyo were formerly 
Tokyo City. Tokyo is the one of the largest cities in the world with an estimated 
population of 13.491 million (as of October 1, 2015); in 2191 km2, the area of Tokyo 
is 0.6% of the total area of Japan. Most of the population reside in 23 wards in where 
9241 million, the Tama area, 4.223 million, and the Islands, 26,000. With a popula-
tion density of 6158 persons/km2, Tokyo is the most densely populated prefecture 
in Japan. Tokyo has 6.946 million households, with an average of 1.94 persons/
household. The number of foreign residents according to the basic resident register 
is 440,000 as of October 1, 2015 [28].
The general Tokyo budget of the 2016 fiscal year was about 7 trillion yen, and 
a total amount of about 13 trillion yen will be reached by adding public enterprise 
accounts as special budget, such as water supply, sewerage, and subway. It is compa-
rable to the national budget of Sweden and Indonesia where it would differ slightly 
due to the exchange rate [29].
2.2.2 Disaster kingdom of Japan: historical natural disasters leave lessons
Tokyo is the capital city of Japan, the kingdom of disasters. In accordance with 
the Lloyd’s report, Tokyo is ranked second for volcanic eruption risk, third for heat 
wave, fourth for windstorms, and sixth for earthquakes. Mega city, Tokyo, is highly 
exposed to man-made and natural threats, which makes it the world’s second-riski-
est city to live in after Taipei; Tokyo risks a possible economic loss of $153.28 billion 
of its GDP by the likelihood of events occurring over the next 10 years. Exposure to 
windstorms may bring Tokyo a loss of $29.06 billion, while exposure to earthquakes 
and flooding may trigger a loss of $18.83 billion and $17.65 billion, respectively. 
However, London-based Lloyds said that Tokyo’s exposure to potential loss is com-
paratively low and accounts for only 10.44% of its $1.47 trillion in estimated annual 
GDP, making it “one of the richest cities.” [1, 10].
Lessons learned from disasters often come after catastrophic economic losses 
[30]. Andrew Coburn [17] summarized the economic loss after Great Hanshin 
earthquake January 17, 1995, Magnitude 7.3 in a slide at the 2015 seminar in London, 
UK. As many of the problems posed by this earthquake were highlighted, Japan 
has renewed many policies, and the citizens’ awareness of the natural disaster has 
increased. After the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, the natural disaster caused 
secondary disasters such as explosions and radioactive spills of nuclear power 
plants, and the fear of a direct underground earthquake in the metropolis of Tokyo 
was heightened.
Japanese society is a well-organized one. Particularly, for Tokyo, rail is extremely 
important as a means of transportation for people and goods, and is well-organized 
11
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and maintained diligently considering that Tokyo has many commuters from sub-
urban area. The national census in 2010 lists the daytime population of Tokyo as 
15.576 million people, which is 2.417 million (or 1.2 times) more than the nighttime 
population figure of 13.159 million. The daytime population index is 118.4 against 
the nighttime population taken at 100. This difference is caused by the population 
of commuting workers and students, constituting a daytime influx from mainly the 
three neighboring prefectures of Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa [28].
During the 2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami, a large population of com-
muters who has difficulty returning home were stuck in Tokyo until the public 
transportation reopened, and some of them chose to walk because they could not 
find the accommodation. According to estimates based on the Internet survey 
published by the Cabinet Office of Japanese Government on 22 November 2011, 
due to the 2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami, approximately 3.52 million people 
in Tokyo, about 670,000 people in Kanagawa Prefecture, about 520,000 people in 
Chiba Prefecture, about 330,000 people in Saitama Prefecture, and about 100,000 
people in the southern part in Ibaraki Prefecture, total 5.55 million people in the 
metropolitan area, experienced difficulty returning home or were unable to return 
home. Hiroi et al. [31, 32] conducted the internet survey 2 weeks after (March 
25–28, 2011) the 2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11, 
2011. According to this survey, about 28% of the outsiders, when the earthquake 
occurred, could not return home during the day. Also, as for the question of what 
was the most troubled matter by this earthquake, 71.1% responded disconnected 
mobile phone system/reception, followed by decommissioned public transport 
such as rail (46.4%), inability to contact the family (37.5%), the home telephone 
not working (35.2%), and short message by the cellular mail not working (32.9%). 
Wendling et al. [33] pointed out that under certain unusual circumstances, such as 
natural disasters, victims are desperate to obtain reliable and relevant information 
from any type of media. Social media can play an important back-up role in dissem-
ination warning and response information if traditional services are overwhelmed 
by demand.
The idea of risk factor as a perceived magnitude of a disaster does not play a very 
important role in the risk perception of natural hazards [8]. However, in terms of 
heuristic rule for Japanese people at least, it is hard to agree with such statement. 
Japanese are being educated about the natural disaster risks and have been trained 
on how to protect themselves and the way to follow the evacuation procedures. 
Most of the populations start from young age of kindergarten. Understanding the 
risk is critical for Japanese people, and therefore, the Japanese government prepares 
manuals and evacuation rules efficiently.
2.2.3 Learn together and survive together
The Tokyo utilizes IT technology as well. Tokyo developed a special website, 
Disaster Prevention Website [34], which provides preparedness information and 
guidelines to follow on emergency circumstance. Much of the information provided 
with the text-to-speech functions for those with vision impairment. However, 
such features must be manually activated via clicking an icon. Thus, the efficiency 
of the use of such function is not yet verified. The organization tree appears to 
be strict and usually follows a top-down command structure. The crisis manage-
ment task team is created to work on establishing a crisis management system to 
gather and analyze information and prepare strategic measures, while disaster 
prevention system describes its liaison relationship with the national govern-
ment, municipalities, and other agencies based on information from the Disaster 
Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms
12
Prevention Center as depicted in Figure 1. However, this structure only explains 
the relationship between governmental agencies. This supposed relationship 
should not only explain the relationship between the provision of information and 
responsibilities of the intergovernmental departments, but should also explain the 
sharing of information and communication flow between the government and the 
residents—which Figure 5 fails in doing. As the risk communication is a multi-way 
interactive communication between sectors, this structure can lead to stagnation of 
communication among the end-users, especially those who are the most vulnerable 
to disasters.
The Tokyo authorities have compiled a manual called “Disaster Preparedness 
Tokyo (東京防災)” to help households get fully prepared for an earthquake directly 
hitting Tokyo and other various disasters (Figure 6).
“Disaster Preparedness Tokyo” is tailored to the various local features of Tokyo, 
its urban structures, and the lifestyles of its residents and contains easy-to-under-
stand information on how to prepare for and respond to a disaster. This informa-
tion will be useful now and in the event of an emergency. This manual consists of 
introduction, five chapters, and a manga comic, which provide guidance from the 
preparedness actions, survival tips, disaster facts and acquisition of information, to 
evacuation procedures. It is unique in that it uses pictures to explain to the foreign-
ers who do not know Japanese or English. In particular, comics explain how to act 
without falling into panic by briefly showing how to deal with an earthquake. In 
this manual, Tokyo authorities have a lot of explanations on how to deal with an 
earthquake. Also, this means how frequently Tokyo is experiencing earthquakes 
and trying to reduce earthquake damages and human losses. In the mega city of 
Tokyo, which has a huge population and economic power, earthquakes are the most 
threatening risk.
2.2.4 Maps are ready for you
The disaster prevention homepage (Figure 7) provides a lot of information as 
much as they can open to the public. The map utilizes the WebGIS function, and it 
is well used to upload the prepared disaster-related information such as the location 
of the facility and road construction information. However, these maps, although 
Figure 5. 
Workflow of the disaster prevention system.
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used extensively during peacetime, are not guaranteed to be used during the time 
of disaster crisis to provide real-time updates of the emergencies. The maps focus 
on the Tokyo metropolitan, which includes 23 wards and neighboring cities under 
Tokyo metropolitan address. Interface of the map has several functions: languages 
(Korean, Japanese, English, and Chinese), facilities (temporary stay facilities, shel-
ters, evacuation areas, water supply points, and medical institutions) and facilities 
Figure 6. 
The English website of “Disaster Preparedness Tokyo” manual; an example of chapters and parts of manga comic.
Figure 7. 
Tokyo provides disaster prevention map, which shows the list of the facilities and locations by different disaster 
types. (a) Interface of Tokyo metropolitan Government’s disaster prevention map with selection functions, 
languages, facilities, and related emergency information according to the name of the administrative district. 
(b) Listed queried information. (c) Google Maps with facility location and its information retrieved by clicking 
the map icon. (d) The road going-home support function shows where to select a road name and it will display 
the main crossing points in the road by a list and icons.
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that are run by organizations and private owners that provide current-state disaster 
status (metropolitan schools, convenience stores, restaurants and fast food shops, 
and gas stations). It seems that these functions are selected by learning from the 
2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami (Figure 7a). There are four additional support 
options: road information supporting returning home, public office list, landslide 
disaster-related information, and real-time weather data risk map, which is linked 
to the Japan Meteorological Agency to obtain the weather data. Users can review 
the desired facility or function by clicking the check box and the query function 
used to open a list with basic information about related facilities (Figure 7b). Then, 
by clicking on the map icon, the Google Maps will retrieve Information about the 
selected facility and display in the form of a memo next to the icon of the facility, so 
the users can quickly find out relevant information (Figure 7c and d).
2.3 Toronto, Canada
Toronto is the capital city of the province of Ontario and the home of 2,929,886 
residents, 6,346,088 residents within the Greater Toronto Area (GTA)2 (as of July 
2017) [35–37]. A dynamic city, Toronto, is a global city where people of various 
nationalities and ethnic groups live together. Geographically, Toronto is located on a 
broad sloping plateau cut by numerous river valleys that cover 641 km2 and shore-
line facing Lake Ontario ,which stretches 43 km (or 138 km when including the bays 
and islands). As of 2007, GDP of Toronto was 168 US billion dollars and $313.1 US 
billion dollars in GTA. Toronto is a popular destination to visit; visitors in GTA were 
recorded as 40 million in 2015 and 93,575 people were counted as nonpermanent 
residents while 23,065 people aboriginal identity who speak over 60 own languages 
by report of 2011 statistic Canada [38].
Toronto, with respect to Seoul or Tokyo, experiences much less diversity and 
scale of natural disasters on average; while Toronto experiences extreme colds 
or heat alerts [39] during its seasonal extremes; it does not encounter hurricane, 
earthquake, tsunami, volcano, or flooding on a regular basis. Thus, in comparison, 
Toronto residents are privileged people in terms of natural disasters.
2.3.1 The emergency plan emphasizes flexibility
The City of Toronto published the Emergency Plan (the Plan, 2017) [40]. In this 
plan, the city is prepared to deal with any kind of hazards. However, historically, the 
City of Toronto did not experience natural disasters as much compared with other cit-
ies in Canada or similarly scaled cities in the world. Nonetheless, the city of Toronto 
states that the city is vulnerable to numerous hazards, not only natural disasters such 
as extreme weather, but also more likely human-caused technological incidents such 
as those involving hazardous materials, infrastructure disruptions, utility and power 
failures, or a cyber-attack. It seems that Toronto recognizes that it is more vulnerable 
to human-caused disasters than to natural disasters from given examples.
The Plan establishes the framework of methodology with necessary documents 
that the city requires to recover the situation to the normal state by mobilization 
of resources in case of emergency, and ensure the roles and responsibilities by 
designing a tool to assist emergency and municipal services. The Plan addresses 
implementation by flexibly delegating appropriate city agencies roles and authori-
ties in an emergency situation; various supports and services must be provided 
immediately from other authorities, such as adequate personnel, equipment, and 
2 The Greater Toronto Area (GTA): the central city of Toronto and the four surrounded regional munici-
palities: Durham, Halton, Peel, and York.
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expertise from response agencies. Reviewing and exercising the plan is also required 
on a regular basis for appropriate implementation. Moreover, most importantly, 
the Plan emphasizes flexibility to adapt to a broad spectrum of emergencies. Also, 
the structure of the supporting agencies provides the direction to save lives, protect 
property and environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, 
and help victims and communities return to normal following an emergency. When 
Toronto faces an emergency situation, the hazard level will determine its emergency 
level among four tier emergency level systems as follows:
• Level 0—Normal
• Level 1—Incident
• Level 2—Emergency
• Level 3—Major emergency
When the hazardous situation is determined as a Level 2 Emergency or in the 
early onset of a Level 3 Major emergency, the operational response team, called 
the Cluster “B”, is called before the Emergency Operations Centre is activated. The 
Cluster “B” provides strategic management, an operational hub, and a supporting 
facility for the coordination of emergency response. The Plan clarifies that “once the 
Emergency Operations Centre is fully activated, the Cluster ‘B’ operational response 
team will transition responsibility for operational response to the Emergency 
Operations Centre to ensure organizational effectiveness and the centralized com-
mand is maintained.” Also, communication activities such as those outlined in the 
emergency information and media relations are respected depending on the nature 
of the emergency.
The Ontario Provincial Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, 
Section 2.1 [41] requires that the City of Toronto must develop and implement 
an emergency management program and adopt it by-law. Training programs and 
exercises for employees of municipalities, identifying the risk level, and educating 
the public on risks to public safety and on public preparedness for emergencies 
are major roles of this act. The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services is committed to ensuring that Ontario’s communities are supported and 
protected by law enforcement and public safety systems that are safe, secure, effec-
tive, efficient, and accountable. Their major roles include maintaining the physical 
and economic security and eliminating hazards to persons or property [42]. The 
City of Toronto should follow this workflow.
2.3.2 Risks with early warning in Toronto
Environment Canada provides the seasonal weather information to the public 
with map that illuminates hazard level, warning, watch, statement, or no alert 
as shown in Figure 8. Torontonians can freely access this information to get the 
climate-related alert. If there is any emergency information with safety issues, 
both Environment Canada Weather Alert website [43] and Toronto’s Alert website 
provide the latest information to the public, so public can follow the direction to 
save their life and property. Public health risk and industrial risk are also the City of 
Toronto’s important concerns, and such information is also provided by the city.
The City of Toronto picks up 10 hazards under three categories in 2017, natural 
hazards, human-caused hazards, and technological hazards; electrical power 
disruption, explosions/fires, winter weather, pandemic, cyber threats, terrorism, 
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epidemic, flood, fuel/natural gas supply disruption, and extreme heat. Risk assess-
ment is followed by the Ontario’s risk assessment matrix (Table 3). Risk severity is 
depicted in different colors (as cited, [44]).
2.3.3 The unique city with diversity
The City of Toronto with diverse races holds 51.5% of visible minority of popula-
tion, and 51.2% of immigrants were born outside of Canada. Among them, 132,765 
people reported that they cannot speak English or French (which are the official 
language of Canada). This is an important fact to keep in mind, as Toronto is a city 
that is home to many immigrants and refugees, in addition to many tourists each 
year. So the City of Toronto must also consider about their vulnerability due to lan-
guage or cultural barriers. Looking at the data of ethnic demography [45], in 2006, 
126 ethnic origins were increased to 278. The different mother tongue (language 
first learned at birth) users are scattered in Toronto which counted to 89 in 2011, 
and 85 in 2016; 14 visible minority groups were counted in 2016. Nonvisible minor-
ity is indicated as groups from countries in Europe; however, it does not indicate 
that they use English or French. Some ethnic neighbors are living together in a com-
munity that makes Toronto hosts a diverse set of towns such as Koreatown, Little 
India, Greektown, Corso Italia, Chinatown, and Little Jamaica. The City of Toronto 
offers to the public its diversity by categories in the 2016 thematic maps where not 
a visible minority or multiple visible minorities reside as their home, for example 
Figure 8. 
Public weather alerts for Ontario, which provide real-time watch/awareness, alert, or no alert information to 
the public directly.
Table 3. 
Risk assessment matrix of Ontario, which the City of Toronto shall follow as a standard to assess and determine 
the risk's level.
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(Figure 9). Understanding the cultural background and language specification is 
important for both those who give support and evacuation instructions and those 
who get help in emergency circumstances. Language/cultural risk in emergency 
situation is another concern for Toronto.
2.3.4 Preparing for a better understanding
The City of Toronto allows the public to access the interactive map, which is 
called wellbeing index (Figure 10) [46]. The city’s wellbeing index includes a 
mapped overlay that shows all community organizations who have agreed to be 
listed as organizations that have the ability to accept volunteers and provide assis-
tance in the event of an emergency.
2.4 Using mass media for risk communication
The recent trend for urgent information dissemination is using on-line based 
technology, such as SNS. Government agents are also using SNS such as Facebook 
(Figure 11), Twitter, YouTube, and others [7]. Especially, depending on the 
people and their culture, specific SNS site is more actively used; for example, 
Figure 9. 
The 2016 thematic maps where not a visible minority or multiple visible minorities are distributed in Toronto.
Figure 10. 
Wellbeing index (map); information is displayed using query function over spatial map.
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Facebook is widely used in the Philippines. As revealed by the 2011 earthquake 
in Japan and the Philippine Typhoon Haiyan [6, 7], the government, the family 
and the volunteer groups all used social networking services to communicate 
information.
Such sophisticated technologies require internet access to use; thus, it would 
be a fatal weakness for areas with little or no internet, such as remote areas or 
even urban areas with decommissioned internet. In a highly developed IT city, 
the disconnection of internet would be a temporary inconvenience, as the public 
would assume that the service will be recovered quickly because it is considered as 
one of top priorities. Urban residents, who tend to be more globalized people due 
to frequent connection to the outside world, use personal IT devices not just to stay 
connected to the world but also to look for better tools and information to make 
themselves feel safe and calm.
3. Conclusion
In terms of disaster risk communication, three cities have been developing effec-
tive methods and have attempted to provide accurate information to the public. 
Tokyo, Seoul, and Toronto have different disaster threatening aspects, population 
characteristics, cultural background, scale, and complexity of the city with physi-
cal infrastructures (such as subway system or electricity supply system), so the 
approach to response to emergencies is differently developed.
In disaster risk management, the disaster cycle has response phase, recovery 
phase, and preparedness phase. In response phase, there are rescue, supply (materi-
als, equipment, medication, etc.), and support. In recovery phase, there are reopen-
ing of the school, repairing of the transportation system, and hard (that is, physical 
and structural) reconstruction and recovery of infrastructure. In preparedness phase, 
there are development of manuals, evacuation drills, public education, and so on. 
Historically, Japanese rely on their government for the entire cycle of a disaster. In the 
case of Tokyo, despite the many efforts Tokyo makes for the safety of its residents, 
the information it provides seems to be closer to risk governance than to risk com-
munication. Information that Tokyo provides is mostly preparedness stage informa-
tion against natural disasters rather than human-related risks, and in general, the 
government tends to be more prompt with its communication on natural disasters. 
Therefore, the public most likely depends more critically on broadcasts, media, SNS, 
and other sources to obtain accurate real-time information on topics about earth-
quake, tsunami, and typhoon more than risks of terrorism and global political threats.
Figure 11. 
Each government’s official Facebook page: Tokyo (left), Seoul (middle), and Toronto (right). Each city tries to 
communicate with the public; individuals, agents, volunteers, media, and each other.
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Won and Kim [47] identified problems by reviewing the disaster and accident 
scenarios of Seoul and suggested new recommendations for risk communication. By 
this study, Seoul needs to realize the uncertainties of the disaster incidents and acci-
dents, especially in highly developed complex urban areas. Earthquake and tsunami 
are not probable natural disasters for Seoul residents, but fine particle dust, such as 
PM2.5 or yellow sand storm containing heavy metals from China are more realistic 
risks. Their suggestion emphasizes that initial response is extremely important, 
and in this early response time stage, every individual should be able to judge the 
current situation and take their own initiative action. This is a particularly impor-
tant point in that it can critically affect the life of oneself at an early point in time. 
On the other hand, the residents in Seoul are dealing with not only high population 
density, but also complicated transportation system and social services. However, 
the public is limited in their awareness and knowledge for disaster response in their 
daily lives—when a crisis occurs, this lack of public awareness/knowledge amplifies 
the extent of the catastrophe or casualties. Nevertheless, manuals and suggestions 
are still deployed in governmental agencies and/or organizations, including public 
and private, and educational sectors.
Considering the hierarchical social work structure in Tokyo and Seoul, top-
down control/command, and bottom-up report system, especially, governmental 
office workers are hired through the employment qualification and hired for 
a permanent position, but because of the culture of rotating the positions, the 
work environments hardly accept flexible self-decision-making with one’s own 
responsibility.
Furthermore, there is no manual for residents of Seoul who may not fully under-
stand the government’s purpose, intention on disaster drills, or their messages to the 
public. There may be many well-made drills, policies, and procedures developed by 
the government, but much of this information do not end up with the public who 
need these to deal with the emergencies because the channels for the information 
to reach these end-users are often broken, incomplete, or complex. Thus, these 
well-developed recommendations and manuals by different government agencies 
would be “floating in the air”, or locked in the storage. This is one of many typical 
examples of the risk communication being unilateral between decision-makers, 
field workers, and the victims, which may be a cause of major controversies in 
bureaucratic administrators.
The unique character of Toronto is the mosaic society with various races and 
cultures. Still, Canadian government is willing to accept new immigrants from 
other countries and is open to refugees, as well. The diversity of Toronto society 
members may characterize the different vulnerability compared to Tokyo and 
Seoul.
Three cities developed many materials to communicate between governmen-
tal agencies and public including manuals and documentary forms, and the clari-
fied relationship between those who command and those who report. According 
to information on the official websites of the cities, despite the development of 
IT functions, Toronto seems to have problems communicating with groups with 
diverse cultural backgrounds and language limitations. Because most informa-
tion requires a fairly high level of English or French and/or IT knowledge or flu-
ency, it seems that the public experiences difficulty accessing information easily 
unless particular attention is paid. Moreover, understanding the risks depends on 
their past experiences, for example, if refugees came from a country in a civil war 
who will be more aware of the risks of war and terrorism than natural disasters. 
This can be even more difficult if the amount of information is large. Thus, pro-
viding a booklet or pamphlet in different languages is an effective way for public 
understanding and education depending on the community’s ethnic population.
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Insurance and financial support allow the victims to return back to their 
home—their original place—easier and quicker. People returning back to their 
communities is a very crucial aspect of the society recovering from an event. People 
return to their communities because of many reasons—memories, assets, land, and 
other aspects of their lives that are precious to them. This allows the community 
to rebuild itself, and thus, stand back on its feet and contribute to the society, both 
economically and culturally. Insurance offered by governmental agencies may 
potentially give a feeling and sense of safety and hope.
Lessons from 2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami show that victims were 
suffering to bring back their original level of quality of life prior to the disaster. 
Many victims never got their original life back because they did not purchase 
the earthquake and tsunami combination insurance. The victims could not get 
the full support from the government up to their expectations. Depending on 
their original level of quality of life, some victims suffered from the feeling 
of relative deprivation and decreased financial flexibility. This suggests that 
mental care of the victims is as important, and having more available options of 
insurance may reduce or prevent further sufferings of their own people and help 
them get back on their feet. This highlights an element that is critical in com-
munity recovery, resilience, and necessity that were absent in the governance of 
the three cities.
Depending on the city and their culture, the disaster cycle is often a spiral 
motion rather than a complete “circle”—as time goes on, as people review and learn 
from their experiences. As technologies improve, many systems and infrastructures 
are either repaired or replaced by faster, cleaner, safer, smarter, or better technolo-
gies and alternative materials, thus improving the system it replaced with a longer-
lasting or more resilient model, leading to a better quality of life for its people and 
social systems.
21
Functional and Technical Methods of Information and Risk Communication
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84488
[1] United Nations. The World’s Cities in 
2016. United Nations; 2017
[2] Renn O. Risk Governance—Coping 
with Uncertainty in a Complex World, 
London. Sterling, VA: Earthscan in the 
UK and USA; 2008. 476 p
[3] Renn O. Risk communication: 
Insight and requirement for designing 
succesfull communication programs 
on health and environmental hazards. 
In: Heath RL, Dan O’Hair H, editors. 
Strategies for Overcoming Challenges 
to Effective Risk Communication. 
New York: Routledge; 2009
[4] Sjöberg L. Factors in risk perception. 
Risk Analysis. 2000;20(1):1-12
[5] Baram M. The right to know and the 
duty to disclose hazard information. 
American Journal of Public Health. 
1984;74(4):385-390
[6] Yi C, Kuri M, Imamura F, Murao O, 
Iuchi K, Izumi T, et al. HFA IRIDeS 
Review Preliminary Report—Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015: 
Building the Resilience of Nations 
and Communities to Disasters. Japan: 
International Research Institute of 
Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku 
University; 2013
[7] Yi C, Kuri M. The prospect of 
online communication in the event of 
a disaster. Journal of Risk Research. 
2016;19(7):951-963
[8] Wachinger G, Renn O, Begg C, 
Kuhlicke C. The risk perception 
paradox—Implications for 
governance and communication 
of natural hazards. Risk Analysis. 
2013;33(6):1049-1065
[9] Lim S. Acase—[MERS 
Correspondence 2] Tell the Truth 
Which We Knew Through Confirmation 
Process. 2015. Available from: https://
acase.co.kr/2015/06/02/mers2/
comment-page-1/#comment-11727 
[Accessed: July 6, 2015]
[10] Lloyds. Lloyd’s City Risk Index 
2015-2025. 2015. Available from: https://
understandrisk.org/publication/
lloyds-city-risk-index-2015-2025/
[11] Seoul Metropolitan Government. 
City Overview. Available from: 
http://english.seoul.go.kr/
get-to-know-us/seoul-views/
meaning-of-seoul/4-population/
[12] The Seoul Institute. Seoul Research 
Data Service. Available from: http://
data.si.re.kr/node/337
[13] Seoul Metropolitan Government. 
Opened Data Plaza. Available from: 
http://data.seoul.go.kr/
[14] Timmons H. The World’s Largest 
City Economies. 2018. Available from: 
https://www.theatlas.com/charts/
ryc_Xtn_ [Accessed: November 9, 2018]
[15] Trujillo JL, Parilla J. Redefining 
Global Cities—The Seven Types of 
Global Metro Economies. The Brookings 
Institution, Metropolitan Policy 
Program; 2016
[16] Statistics Korea, Social Research 
Results for 2018 (Family, Education, 
Health, Safety, Environment). 2018. 
Available from: http://kostat.go.kr/
assist/synap/preview/skin/doc.
html?fn=synapview371501_1&rs=/
assist/synap/preview [Accessed: 
November 5, 2018]
[17] Coburn A. The Lloyd’s City 
Risk Index 2015-2025—Special 
Methodology Seminar Lloyd’s City 
Risk Index—Methodology and Usage 
of City Economy Risk Analysis. 2015. 
Available from: https://www.jbs.cam.
ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/
centres/risk/downloads/150903_
References
Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms
22
lloydscityriskindexlaunch_coburn_
presentation.pdf [Accessed: October 6, 
2015]
[18] South Korea News Net. Tycoon 
Wanted in Fatal South Korean Boat 
Capsize Found Dead. 2014. Available 
from: https://www.southkoreanews.net/
news/224021035/tycoon-wanted-in-
fatal-south-korean-boat-capsize-found-
dead [Accessed: November 9, 2018]
[19] Park M, Hancocks P. Sewol Ferry 
Disaster: One Year on, Grieving 
Families Demand Answers; CNN. 
2015. Available from: https://www.cnn.
com/2015/04/15/asia/sewol-ferry-korea-
anniversary/index.html [Accessed: 
November 9, 2018]
[20] The Editorial Board of the New York 
Times. Duty and Shame as the Ship 
Sank; The New York Times. 2014. 
Available from: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/04/23/opinion/duty-and-
shame-as-the-ship-sank.html
[21] Mullen J, Kim S. South Korea 
Cracking Down on Operator in Sewol 
Ferry Disaster; CEO Arrested; CNN. 
2014. Available from: https://www.cnn.
com/2014/05/08/world/asia/south-
korea-ship-sinking/index.html
[22] City of Seoul, Seoul Crisis 
Management Communication 
Guidelines. 2014. Available from: 
https://opengov.seoul.go.kr/
public/5349666
[23] Seoul Metropolitan Facilities 
Management Corporation. Safety 
Department, Strengthening the 
Reporting System for Disasters; 2016
[24] National Emergency Management 
Agency of Korea. Disaster Preparedness 
Training Manual; 2013
[25] Choe S. South Korea’s Leader 
and Media Face Scrutiny Over Ferry 
Disaster; The New York Times. 2014. 
Available from: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/10/world/asia/south-
koreas-leader-and-media-face-scrutiny-
over-ferry-disaster.html
[26] Seoul Safety Nuri Portal Site. 
Available from: http://safecity.seoul.
go.kr:8070/scmyn_cf/map/cfMap.
do?type=hewaRefuge#
[27] Water Journal (Online). Future 
Sewer Policy Direction of Seoul City 
[Issue & Trend]. 2017. Available 
from: http://www.waterjournal.co.kr/
news/articleView.html?idxno=38539 
[Accessed: September 28, 2017]
[28] Metropolitan Government Tokyo. 
Statistics Division, Bureau of General 
Affairs, Population of Tokyo. Available 
from: http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/
english/about/history/history03.html
[29] Nikkei. The Budget of Tokyo 
is 13 trillion yen. Equivalent to 
Sweden. 2016. Available from: 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/
DGXKZO05133170S6A720C1CC0000/ 
[Accessed: November 7, 2018]
[30] Lloyd’s. Emerging Risk Report 2017. 
Understanding risk—Reimagining 
History Counterfactual Risk Analysis. 
Available from: https://www.lloyds.
com/~/media/files/news-and-insight/
risk-insight/2017/reimagining-history.
pdf
[31] Hiroi U, Sekiya N, Nakajima R, 
Waragai S, Hanahara H. Questionnaire 
survey concerning stranded commuters 
in metropolitan area. Journal of Social 
Safety Science. 2011;15:343-353
[32] Hiroi U, Oomori T, Shinkai H. 
Evacuation simulation in metropolitan 
area and risk maps of heavy traffic and 
crowd in catastrophic disaster. Journal 
of Japan Association for Earthquake 
Engineering. 2016;16(5):5_111-5_126. 
DOI: 10.5610/jaee.16.5_111
[33] Wendling C, Radisch J, Jacobzone S.  
The Use of Social Media in Risk and 
23
Functional and Technical Methods of Information and Risk Communication
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84488
Crisis Communication, OECD Working 
Papers on Public Governance; No. 
24. OECD Publishing; 2015. DOI: 
10.1787/5k3v01fskp9s-en
[34] Tokyo Disaster Prevention Website. 
Available from: http://www.bousai.
metro.tokyo.jp/foreign/english/kitaku_
portal/2001064/2001072.html
[35] Statistics Canada. Census of 
Population. 2016. Available from: https://
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-
m/11-627-m2017025-eng.htm
[36] City of Toronto. Available from: 
www.toronto.ca/
[37] Canada Population. Available from: 
https://www.canadapopulation.org/
toronto-population/
[38] City of Toronto. Toronto at a Glance. 
Available from: https://www.toronto.ca/
city-government/data-research-maps/
toronto-at-a-glance/
[39] City of Toronto. Public Safety & 
Alert. Available from: https://www.
toronto.ca/community-people/public-
safety-alerts/emergency-preparedness/
before-an-emergency/
[40] The City of Toronto. The 
Emergency Plan; 2017
[41] Ontario Emergency Management 
and Civil Protection Act. R.S.O. Chapter 
E.9 (From December 15, 2009 to the 
e-Laws currency date). 1990. Available 
from: https://www.ontario.ca/laws/
statute/90e09
[42] The Ministry of Community 
Safety and Correctional Services, 
Ontario. Guide to Incident Management 
System (IMS) Implementation. 
Available from: https://www.
emergencymanagementontario.ca/
english/home.html
[43] Public Weather Alerts for Ontario. 
Available from: https://weather.gc.ca/
warnings/index_e.html?prov=son 
[Accessed: November 11, 2018]
[44] Public Services Health & Safety 
Association and Toronto Central Local 
Health Integration Network (LHIN). A 
Guide to an Emergency Management 
Plan; 2014
[45] City of Toronto. Toronto 
Social Atlas. Available from: 
https://www.toronto.ca/city-
government/data-research-maps/
neighbourhoods-communities/
toronto-social-atlas/
[46] City of Toronto. Community 
Partners on the Wellbeing Index. 
Available from: https://www.toronto.ca/
community-people/public-safety-alerts/
emergency-preparedness/during-an-
emergency/community-partners-on-
the-wellbeing-index/
[47] Won J, Kim S. A Study of 
Developing Disasters and Incidents 
Scenarios Based on Emergency 
Responses by The Seoul Institute; 2017
